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DEVELOPING A VICTIMS' S1:JIT FOR 
INJURIES CAUSED BY A COMPULSORILY 
RELEASED PRISONER 
In the last decade, overcrowding in American prisons has reached 
critical levels. 1 A number of courts have held that current overcrowded 
conditions constitute an imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. 2 
Accordingly, some courts have accompanied their decisions with orders 
mandating the reduction of prison populations. 3 Due to the unavailabil-
ity of additional space and the lack of funding required to construct 
additional facilities, 4 these orders to reduce the prison population have 
l. Since 1969, the number of persons held in state and federal prisons has increased by sixty-
eight percent to 328,695 in 1980. Sixty-five percent of all state and federal inmates and sixty-eight 
percent of all local prisoners are housed in cells and dormitories that provide less than 60 square 
feet per person. In 1980, because of overcrowding in 16 states, almost 6,000 persons were being 
held in local jails. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT CIUME 
IN THE UNITED STATES 49 (1982) (hereinafter cited as VIOLENT CRIME STATISTICS]. By 1981, federal 
and state prisons exceeded their capacity by nearly 100,000 inmates. Oest & Solorzano, Bulging 
Prisons Bracing for New Disorders, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., June 8, 1981, at 31. By May 
of 1982, there were 369,009 inmates in state and federal prisons - an increase of approximately 
120/o over the prior year. Full House in America's Prisons, U.S. NEWS & Wotu.D REP., May 
17, 1982, at 17. 
2. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman 
v. Alabama, S59 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 
781, cert. denied in part, 438 U.S. 91S (1978); Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. 
Fla. 197S), vacated S39 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd percuriam, 430 U.S. 325 (1977); Williams 
v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977). 
3. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 332 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman 
v. Alabama, 5S9 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 
781, cert. denied in part, 438 U.S. 91S (1978); Costello v. Wainwright. 397 F. Supp. 20, 34 
~.D. Fla. 197S). 
4. In 1978, it cost an average of $50,000 to build a single maximum security cell. In 1982, 
that cost rose to approximately $70,000. VIOLENT C!uME STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 43. Alaska 
reported $130,000 as the average cost of prison construction per cell. Although, by July of 1980, 
state correctional agencies had begun new construction of more than 60 institutions or additions, 
several states found the process so costly that they could not complete their efforts or have va-
cant facilities because they could not afford staffing or operations. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 76 (1981) [hereinafter cited 
as VIOLENT CRIME REPORT]. In addition, citizens have begun to exhibit their dissatisfaction with 
prison-building as a preventative of crime. For example, in November 1981, New York State voters 
defeated a $500 million prison bond issue. Specter, The Untried Alternative to Prisons, 234 NA-
TION 300 (1982). In response to this dilemma, the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent 
Crime recommended that the federal government provide funds to assist state prison-building 
projects, and donate abandoned facilities (e.g., military bases) for use as state prisons. VIOLENT 
C!uME REP01n, supra, at 75. Even assuming, however, that states could circumvent the economic 
obstacles, a strong ideological strain opposes the construction of additional prisons. See, e.g., 
N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 5-6 (1974) ("From John Barlow Martin to Jessica 
Mitford a popular prison abolitionist literature has grown, and scholars have been hardly less 
critical .... There is widespread advocacy of a swift abatement if not an abolition of imprison-
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often compelled state officials to release large numbers of inmates. 5 
Although such compulsory prisoner releases alleviate overcrowding, they 
may also accelerate the rate of recidivism and increase the overall level 
of crime. 6 Moreover, while the state may be responsible for this in-
creased crime, the injured victims have no effective legal means of 
holding the state liable or recovering for the harm imposed upon them. 7 
State victim compensation funds provide only inconsistent and in-
complete relief. 8 Victim restitution statutes allow for relief only if the 
criminal has been apprehended and the state provides work sufficient 
to cover the costs of restitution. 9 Finally, civil suits directly against 
the criminal provide relief only in those rare instances in which poverty 
does not prevent the criminal from paying the judgment. 10 More com-
prehensive, more consistent relief is necessary. 
This Note advocates the development of a tort remedy for victims 
ment."}; R. SOMMER, THE END OF IMPRISONMENT (1976} (advocating the abolition of the "long 
term warehousing" of criminals). 
5. In the summer of 1981, Alabama released 277 inmates under court order. Andersen, What 
Are Prisons For?, TIME, Sept. 13, 1982, at 38, 40. In March 1981, Illinois granted early release 
to 223 inmates. Rosenblatt, Why the Justice System Fails, TIME, Mar. 23, 1981, at 22, 23. Similarly, 
Georgia, Maryland, and Virginia have granted early release to large numbers of prisoners. See 
Yesterday's "Baby Boom" is Overcrowding Today's Prisons, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Mar. 
I, 1976, at 65, 67; Why American Prisons Are Powder Kegs, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 
18, 1980, at 68. Georgia released nearly 8,000 prisoners between July 1982 and July 1983. 
Silas, Lock 'Em Up? There's No More Room!, 69 A.B.A. J. 1351, 1352 (1983). 
6. The actual effects of compulsory prisoner releases upon the rates of recidivism and crime 
remain rather speculative. For example, a preliminary study by the Michigan Department of 
Corrections found that 117 prisoners granted early release under the Michigan Prison Overcrowding 
Emergency Powers Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 800.71-.79 (1982}, were arrested before 
their original minimum sentence would normally have expired. The 117 crimes committed by these 
prisoners consisted of 2 homicides, 4 sexual assaults, 9 robberies, 24 assaults, and 78 burglaries, 
auto thefts, and larcenies. Detroit News, Sept. 26, 1982, § B, at 1, col. 4 (citing study by the 
Michigan Department of Corrections}. Still, as observed by Michigan Deputy Corrections Direc-
tor William Kane, such an increase might have occurred without the emergency release, because 
those inmates would have been freed within a matter of weeks anyway. See id. Nonetheless, 
the Michigan Act specifically provides that all prisoners to receive early parole would have other-
wise been paroled within ninety days - a safeguard not incorporated into most court-ordered 
releases. But see Lane v. Sklodowski, No: 58601 (Ill. July 12, 1983} (prohibiting the Corrections 
Department from granting more than ninety days of meritorious good time for each inmate}. 
A study of the recidivism rate of inmates released pursuant to the retroactive order of Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963} (holding that counsel is required in felony cases) suggested 
that such releases did not have a statistically significant impact on the crime rate. R. GOLDFARB 
& L. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 179-80 (1973}. Nonetheless, the Gideon releases are distinguishable 
from compulsory releases. Gideon releases are ordered because of a constitutional error in the 
judicial process - an error that might result in an erroneous finding of guilt. Compulsory releases, 
however, are ordered because of a constitutional error in the co"ectional process - an error 
that does not affect the probability of the inmate's guilt or innocence. Thus, the small impact 
of the Gideon releases may imply that faulty judicial proceedings resulted in the erroneous con-
viction of a large number of innocent and nondangerous individuals. 
7. See infra notes 17-34 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. 
IO. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
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injured by a compulsorily released prisoner. This remedy would be based 
on existing tort theory pernµtting suits against third parties whose 
negligence causes or facilitates a criminal act. The victim would bring 
suit against both the state and third parties who aided in the criminal 
release determination .. To support his claim, the victim would allege: 
(1) that state officials negligently selected the offending inmate for early 
release; and (2) that the state negligently maintained the unconstitu-
tional prison conditions which precipitated the release. 
Part I of this Note discusses the history, causes, and results of com-
pulsory prisoner releases. Part II demonstrates the inadequacy of ex-
isting remedies available to the victims of compulsorily released 
prisoners. Part III applies the principles of tort theory to develop a 
more effective remedy. Finally, Part IV addresses governmental im-
munity as a potential obstacle to such a suit, and advocates the waiver 
of immunity to ensure victim compensation and to encourage thoughtful 
prisoner releases. 
I. COMPULSORY PRISONER RELEASES 
In recent years, American prisons have become grossly overcrowded. 11 
Several courts have held that such overcrowded conditions are 
· unconstitutional, 12 and have remedied this overcrowding by ordering 
the release of a portion of the inmate population. 13 Moreover, several 
states have enacted laws automatically providing for the release of in-
mates when overcrowding becomes intolerable. ' 4 Unfortunately, 
although many courts and legislatures have found the compulsory release 
of prisoners the only viable solution to overcrowding, this "solution" 
exacts significant social costs. Compulsory releases may increase crime 
by prematurely freeing dangerous inmates, u and by encouraging 
disrespect for the laws by converting the imposition of punishment. into 
a haphazard and unpredictable process. 16 A greater recognition of vie-
11. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
12. See supra note· 2 and accompanying text. 
13. See supra notes 3 & 5 and accompanying text. 
14. See CoNN. GEN. STAT.§§ 18-87c, 18-87d (1981); GA. CODE ANN.§ 77-549 (Cum. Supp. 
(1982); 1981 Iowa Acts 11, § 3(1); Mica. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 800.71-79 (1982); S.J. Res. 14, 
38th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1981 Okla. Sess. Laws 1291, For a thorough discussion of the Michigan 
statute and related issues, see Note, Relief from Prison Overcrowding: Evaluating Michigan's 
Accelerated Parole Statute, 1S U. MicH. J.L. REP. S47 (1982). 
IS. See supra note 6. 
16. Prison overcrowding prevents many judges from imposing any sentence at all, and early 
releases prevent imposed sentences from being served. See TWENTIETH CENnJR.y FuND, TASK 
FORCE ON CtuMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 13-14 (1976) ("Those whom 
the judge decides should be imprisoned are often given sentences with relatively high maximums, 
on the understanding that the parole board will release them earlier if the circumstances warrant 
it."). This haphazard imposition of punishment may reinforce the prisoner's conception of the 
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tims' rights would limit the detrimental effects of compulsory releases 
and would help preserve public safety. 
II. VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
Largely as a result of the victims' rights movement, 17 several legal 
recourses have become available to the victims of crime. Yet, none 
of these alternatives would provide adequate compensation to a victim 
for injuries caused by a compulsorily released prisoner. 
First, the victim might try to recover from a state victim compensa-
tion fund. A growing number of state statutes provide for com-
pensation funds. 18 Unfortunately, such funds never apply to every vie-
state as an impotent agent, and may cause the prisoner to believe that he can commit criminal 
acts with relative impunity. See R. SOMMER, supra note 4, at 174 ("[T]he infrequent, arbitrary, 
or half-hearted enforcement of moral precepts reduces the commitment among members of the 
community ••.• Next to nonenforcement of laws, the factor which contnbutes most to disrespect 
for law is the disparate and sometimes whimsical imposition of penalties . • . • "). Moreover, 
the element of compulsion which underlies court-ordered releases (as opposed to the correspond-
ing element of clemency which underlies parole) may lead the prisoner to perceive the state as 
ineffectual. 
17. The term "victims rights movement" refers to a multi-disciplinary movement directed 
towards studying and developing victims' rights. At the scholarly level, a significant body of 
sociological research has begun to define and explore the field of "victimology." See, e.g., M. 
HINDEI.ANG, CR!MINAL VICTIMIZATION IN EIGHT AMERICAN CmEs (1976); M. HINDEI.ANG, M. Gorr-
FREDSON & J. GAROFALO, VICTIMS OF PERSONAL CRIMii: AN EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION FOR A THEORY 
OF PERSONAL VICTIMIZATION (1978); VICTIMOLOGY: A NEW Focus (I. Drapkin & E. Viano eds. 
1973); E. ZIEGENHAGEN, VICTIMS, CRIME, AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1977). At the judicial level, an 
increasing cognizance of victims' rights has also become evident. See F. CARRINGTON, NEITHER 
CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 73-81 {1978) (discussing judicial attention to victims' rights in causes raising 
questions of capital punishment). Finally, at the popular level, a variety of books, articles and 
organizations offer practical counsel to those who have been victimized. See generally M. BARD 
& D. SANGREY, THE CRIMii VICTIM'S BOOK (1979); R. REIFF, THE INVISmLE VICTI?d (1979),; J. 
BARKAS, VICTIMS (1978). In order to increase public consciousness of the plight of victims, Presi-
dent Reagan declared April 19-26, 1982, Crime Victims Week. President's Announcement of Pro-
clamation 4929, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 478 (Apr. 14, 1982). 
18. See AusKA STAT. §§ 18.67.010-.180 (1981); CAL. Gov'T CoDE §§ 13959-13969.1 (West 
1980 & Supp. 1983); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ S4-201 to -217 (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 
9001-9017 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. §§ 960.01-.25 (1981 & Supp. 1982); GA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 28-5-100 to -108 (1981); HAWAIJ R.Ev. STAT. §§ 351-1 to -70 (1976 & Supp. 1982); ILL. 
REv. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 71-84 (1981 & Supp. 1982); IND. CODE §§ 16-7-3.6-1 to -3.6-19 (Cum. 
Supp. 1979); KY. R.Ev. STAT.§§ 346.010-.190 (1983); LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.§§ 46.1801-.1821 (West 
1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1982); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A (Law. 
Cq-op. 1980 & Supp. 1983); MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 18.351-.368 (1979); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 
595.010-.070 (Cum. Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 53-9-101 to-133 (1981); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. 
§§ 81-1801 to -1842 (1981); NEV. R.Ev. STAT.§§ 217.010-.350 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 52.4B-l 
to -25 (West Supp. 1983-1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-22-1 to -21 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983); 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW§§ 620-63S (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1982-1983); Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. §§ 
2743.51-.72 (Page 1981 & Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 142.1-.18 (1981); OR. REv. STAT. 
§§ 147.00S-.365 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 12-25-1 to -14 (1981); S.C. CoDE ANN.§§ 16-3-1110 
to -1340 (Cum. Supp. 1982); TENN. CoDE ANN.§§ 29-13-101 to -208 (1980 & Supp. 1983); TEX. 
R.Ev. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1 (Supp. 1982-1983); VA. CooE §§ 19.2-368.1 to -368.18 (1983); 
WASH. REv. CODE §§ 7.68.010 to -.910 (1981 & Supp. 1982). For a general, though currently 
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tim of crime, and rarely provide full compensation to any victim of 
crime. 19 
Alternatively, the victim might attempt to recover damages under 
a restitution program. 20 Under a typical victim restitution statute, the 
incomplete, overview of the administration, budget, and limitation of these funds, see Hoelzel, 
A su,.-,:ey of 27 victim compensation programs, 63 JUDICATURE 48S (1980). 
A number of criminologists and legal scholars have advocated the development of a federal 
victim compensation act. See, e.g .• N. MoRlUS & G. HAWKINS, I...EtTER TO THE PRESmENT ON 
CRIME CONTROL 70 (1977) ("the federal government [should intervene] to rectify a manifest in-
justice and fulfill a need that is not being met by the few state-administered compensation 
schemes"). Recently, the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime recommended that 
a study of various crime victim compensation programs be conducted. VIOLENT CRmE REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 91. Consequently, a federal victim compensation act has been proposed. See 
S. 2433, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 CONG. REc. 3861-63 (1982). For a history of the numerous 
aborted attempts to enact federal victim compensation legislation, see Edelhertz, Compensating 
Victims of Violent Crime, in VIOLENCE AND CRIMINAL JumcE 82-83 (D. Chappell & J. Monahan 
eds, 197S). 
19. See generally R. RIEFF, supra note 17, at xii ("Token state compensation laws are enacted 
that are bureaucratically rationed by failing to provide public information about them, restric-
ting eligibility to paupers, and instituting application and investigative processes that may take 
as much as seven months before an award can be made."); J. BAIUCAS, supra note 17, at 18S-91; 
see also Compensation to Victims of Crimes of Personal Violence: An Examination of the Scope 
of the Problem, SO MINN. L. REv. 211 (196S); Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence, 
8 J. PUB. L. 191 (19S9) (symposia exhaustively analyzing the philosophical, sociological, 
and practical aspects and difficulties of victim compensation). For model victim compensation 
plans, and discussions of their scope and limitations, see Childres, Compensation for Criminally 
Inflicted Personal Injury, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 444 (1964); D. CARROW, CRmE VICTIM COMPENSA-
TION: PROGRAM MODEL (1980). 
20. The format and complexity of restitution statutes vary significantly. A number of statutes 
merely enumerate possible conditions to probation, and include restitution among the alternatives. 
See ARlc. STAT. ANN.§ 43-2331 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1203 (West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ S3a-30 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 948.03 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-3S (1981); Ill. REv. STAT. 
ch. 38, § 1005-6-3 (1982); IND. CODE§ 3S-7-2-1 (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4610 (1981); LA. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 89S-89S.1 (West Supp. 1983); M1cH. CoMP. LAWS§ 771.3 (1979); 
Mo. REv. STAT.§ 5S9.021 (Cum. Supp. 1982); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2219 (Cum. Supp. 1982); 
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:4S-l (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 65.10 (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-1343 (1978 & Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07 (1976); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 22, § 991a (Supp. 1982); OR. REv. STAT. § 137.540 (1981); TEX. CODE CIUM. PROC. ANN. 
art. 42.12, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 76-3-201 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 28, § 2S2 (Cum. Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE§ 62-12-9 (Cum. Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. 
§ 973.09 (1981-1982). Other statutes deal solely with restitution, but allow for considerable judicial 
discretion. See Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-803 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 176.189 (1981); VA. 
CODE § 19.2-30S (1983); Wvo. STAT. § 7-13-308 (Cum. Supp. 1983). A number of statutes pro-
vide elaborate guidelines for determination of the amount of restitution. See ALA. CoDE § 1S-18-68 
(1982); loWA CODE§ 907.12 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1325 (1964); MtsS. CODE 
ANN.§ 99-37-3 (Cum. Supp. 1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 1106 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 12-19-32 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-28 (Cum. Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 40-3S-304 (1982); WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.140 (Supp. 1982). Some Statutes direct 
the court to place considerable emphasis on the ability of the probationer to pay. See ALAsKA 
STAT. § 12.S5.04S (1980); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-204 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1982); HAWAII 
REv. STAT. § 706-605 (1976 & Supp. 1982). A few statutes integrate restitution with compensa-
tion, or with various concepts of debtor-creditor law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9010 (1979) 
(restitution listed as an alternative within victim compensation act); KY. REv. STAT. § 346.180 
(1983) (victim recovers under compensation fund; repayment to state may become condition of 
criminal's probation); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 637 (1982) (allowing for restitution through 
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court may condition a criminal's probation upon the timely payment 
of restitution to the victim. Unfortunately, numerous difficulties sur-
round such programs. First, abuses of conditional probation have 
prompted some states to narrow the powers of the court in this area. 21 
Second, courts can order restitution only if the criminal has been 
apprehended. 22 Third, public ignorance of restitution has prevented its 
extensive and effective implementation.23 Finally, the probationer may 
be unable to locate work sufficient to cover both the costs of restitu-
tion and personal expenses. 24 
work release or through creation of execution lien on defendant's property). Two states have 
statutes which do not specifically provide for restitution, but which are sufficiently broad to 
accommodate an order of restitution. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-2-1 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 24-21-430 (1976). One controversial form of restitution allows the victim to bring an action 
to compel the criminal-turned-author to disgorge profits. See generally Note, Criminals-Turned-
Authors; Victims' Rights v. Freedom of Speech, 54 IND. L.J. 443 (1978-1979). New York has 
enacted a statute requiring restitution by criminals-turned-authors, N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 632-a (McKin-
ney Supp. 1978), and the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 
97-291, § 7, 1982 U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao. NEWS (96 Stat.) 1248, provides that the Attorney 
General shall report to Congress "regarding any laws that are necessary to ensure that no Federal 
felon derives any profit from the sale of the recollections, thoughts, and feelings of such felon 
with regards to the offense committed by the felon until any victim of the offense receives 
restitution." 
21. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 771.3 historical note (1982). Indeed, a number of 
statutes direct the focus of the court on the ability of the probationer to pay. See supra note 
20. People v. Gallagher, 55 Mich. App. 613, 223 N.W.2d 92 (1974), probably exemplifies the 
type of abuse which prompted the narrowing of probation conditioned upon restitution. In 
Gallagher, the defendant was convicted of receiving only a stolen automobile cowl. Nonetheless, 
the court conditioned the defendant's probation upon his restitution of the full value of the 
automobile. 
Abuses of judicial discretion unrelated to restitution have also limited the use of conditional 
probation. For example, in People v. Blankenship, 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 61 P .2d 352 (1936), 
the California court granted probation to a twenty-three-year-old man, infected with a social 
disease and convicted of statutory rape, conditional upon his submission to an operation for 
sterilization. Justice Smith of the Michigan Supreme Court, commenting on Blankenship, sar-
donically observed that "[t]he condition was upheld on appeal but the report does not tell us 
of the choice made." People v. Becker, 349 Mich. 476, 488, 84 N.W.2d 833, 839 (1957). 
22. This limitation renders restitution useless in a large number of cases. In 59.511/o of violent 
crimes, the criminal is not apprehended. Forty-one percent result in an arrest, but only 230/o 
result in a trial and only 14.20/o result in a conviction. VIOLENT C!uMB STATISTICS, supra note 
I, at 47. 
23. See Henderson & Gitchoff, Using Experts and Victims in the Sentencing Process, 17 CRIM. 
LAW BULL. 226, 230 (1981) ("[victims who participated in the study) seldom considered restitu-
tion as a part of sentencing because they were uninformed of its availability"). To help cure 
this ignorance, the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 
5, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS (96 Stat.) 1248, requires federal judges to include a state-
ment of restitution when sentencing criminals. Of course, this Act only alleviates the difficulty 
in federal courts. 
24. See R. REIFF, supra note 17, at xii ("Token restitution programs are launched and im-
mediately founder on the corrections system's failure to provide work at realistic pay rates that 
would make restitution payments possible."); see also R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, supra note 
6, at 235 ("An installment plan may aid the offender in making payments, but in many cases 
only partial restitution is possible."). For a variety of reasons, victims rarely receive full restitu-
tion. See Miller, Consequences of Restitution, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAVIOR I, 15 (1981) ("[M[any 
crime victims are not fully recompensed for their tangible losses; ... about 140/o of crime victims 
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As a third option, the victim might pursue a civil action against the 
criminal. While few legal obstacles preclude such a suit, the criminal's 
poverty will often make obtaining payment of any judgment a prac-
tical impossibility. 25 Indeed, many civil suits against criminals result in 
nothing more than some minimal psychological solace to the victim. 26 
Finally, the victim might bring an action against a third party whose 
negligence caused or facilitated the criminal act. 27 Such suits, typically 
predicated upon the third party's breach of its custodial duty, have 
included actions against hospital superintendents, 28 members of a tem-
porary release committee, 29 psychiatrists and psychiatric hospitals, 30 
employees of a military base hospital, 31 members of a parole board, 32 
•.• received no monetary restitution even though its payment was ordered by the judge. Overall, 
victims can expect to receive about two-thirds of the restitution ordered at sentencing."). 
25. See J. BARKAS, supra note 17, at 178-80. 
There is, however, the possibility of increasing the effectiveness of civil suits by imprisoning 
the criminal for failure to pay debts arising from the tort suit. Toe victim might pursue such 
a civil suit because (1) he or she would only bear the burden of proving the case by a preponderance 
of evidence, and (2) "[m)any states statutorily provide for imprisonment for failure to satisfy 
liability resulting from tortious conduct, fraud, or breach of fiduciary relationship." D. EPSTEIN 
& J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: CAsES AND MATERIALS 77 (1982). Adequate analysis 
of the costs, benefits, and constitutional implications of such an action require discussion beyond 
the scope of this Note. 
26. See, e.g., Carrington, Victim's Rights Litigation: A Wave of the Future?, 11 U. RtcH. 
L. REv. 447, 457-59 (1977). 
27. See generally Carrington, supra note 26, at 459-69; Comment, Victims' Suits Against 
Government Entities and Officials for Reckless Release, 29 AM. U.L. REv. 595 (1980); Note, 
California's Approach to Third Party Liability for Criminal Violence, 13 Lov. L.A.L. REv. 
535 (1980). 
28. See, e.g., Austin W. Jones Co. v. State, 122 Me. 214, 119 A. 577 (1923) (holding superinten-
dent liable for fire damages caused by a negligently paroled mental patient); Cappel v. Pierson, 
15 La. App. 524, 132 So. 391 (1931) (finding superintendent's release of acutely paranoid mental 
patient, who murdered plaintifrs husband the day of release, did not constitute the proximate 
cause of the decedent's death). 
29. See, e.g., Santangello v. State, 48 A.D.2d 422, 370 N. Y.S.2d 246 (1975) (holding Tem-
porary Release Committee not immune from suit by negligently released inmate). 
30. See, e.g., Merchant's Bank & Trust v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967) 
(holding V.A. hospital liable for acts of patient transferred to "work ranch," because the hospital 
did not notify the ranch personnel that the patient required close supervision); Heifetz v. 
Philadelphia State Hosp., 482 Pa. 386, 383 A.2d 1160 (1978) (holding psychiatrist liable for negli-
gently releasing patient who sexually assaulted plaintiff's tenant); Tarasoff v. Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (holding psychiatrist liable 
for failure to warn victim of patient); Leverett v. State, 61 Ohio App. 2d 35, 399 N.E.2d 106 
(1978) (holding psychiatric hospital liable for acts of negligently release patient). 
31. See, e.g., Underwood v. United States, 3S6 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding immunity 
inapplicable to federal hospital for failure to warn Air Force psychiatrist of mental patient's 
past record); Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956) (holding immunity inapplicable 
to Air Force hospital that failed to warn potential victims upon release of mental patient). 
32. See, e.g., Estate of Armstrong v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 46 Pa. Cornrow. 
33, 405 A.2d 1099 (1979) (holding immunity did not obstruct a tort action against members of 
a parole board for releasing the inmate who raped and murdered the plaintifrs seven-year-old 
daughter); Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977). 
(holding parole board members liable for releasing an inmate who shot the plaintifrs son in 
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probation officers, 33 police officers, 34 and many other public and private 
individuals and institutions. 
This type of suit - although it has not yet been used by the victims 
of compulsorily released prisoners - provides the best possible basis 
for effective relief. By proving that (1) state parole board officials 
negligently selected the off ending prisoner for release, or (2) that the 
state negligently maintained the unconstitutional prison conditions 
precipitating the release of a dangerous individual, the victim could 
establish a strong framework for tort liability. If the compulsory nature 
of the release renders it difficult to prove that the parole board acted 
negligently in releasing the prisoner, then the victim could allege 
negligence in the state's maintenance of its prison facilities. Unfor-
tunately, sovereign and official immunity might prevent the victim from 
imposing liability upon the state. Yet, as the next two sectioris 
demonstrate, this problem may be overcome through the careful ap-
plication and minor modification of tort and immunity principles._ 
III. A VICTIM'S SUIT FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY A 
COMPULSORILY RELEASED PRISONER: THE ELEMENTS OF TORT 
A. Duty 
Perhaps no element of tort law entails as many moral implications 
as does the concept of duty. The creation of an affirmative legal duty 
establishes a moral norm and imposes upon individual liberty. Therefore, 
most courts have been reluctant to create new legal duties, particularly 
if such a duty would obligate any individual to act as a "Good 
Samaritan. " 35 
the course of an armed robbery). But see Pate v. Alabama, 409 F. Supp. 478 (M.D. Ala. 1976) 
(holding that immunity obstructed a tort action against a board of pardons and paroles for 
negligently releasing the individual who killed the plaintiff's daughter), aff'd, 548 F.2d 354 (5th 
Cir. 1977). See generally, Note, Parole Board Liability for the Criminal Acts of Parolees: Reiser 
v. District of Columbia, 8 CAP. U.L. REv. 149 (1978); Note, Liability for Parole Decisionmak-
ing: The Absence of Discretion in the Parole Process, 32 MERCER L. R:Ev. 13H (1981); Note, 
Civil Liability of Parole Officials for Releasing Dangerous Prisoners: Martinez v. California, 
16 TULSA L.J. 229 (1980). 
33. See Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., S38 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding probation officer, 
who released mental patient without court approval, liable for patient's murder of plaintiff's 
decedent), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976). 
34. See, e.g., Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 
265 (1958) (holding that plaintiff stated a cause of action by asserting that the police had failed 
in their duty to protect the plaintiff's decedent (an underworld informer) from harm). But see 
Evett v. Inverness, 224 So. 2d 365 (F1a. 1969) (holding police officer - who stopped an intox-
icated driver, but allowed him to continue - not liable for driver's subsequent collision with 
the vehicle of the plaintiff's decedent), cert. dismissed, 232 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1970). 
35. An established exception to this rule arises when an individual has caused the other in-
dividual's harm. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 322 (1977). Also, several states have 
FALL 1983) Victims' Suits 107 
An increasing number of courts, however, have imposed a duty upon 
certain individuals to aid, warn, or protect certain other individuals, 
and have based this duty upon the "special relationship" between the 
parties involved. 36 For example, courts have held that a common car-
rier has a duty to protect passengers from the dangerous conduct of 
others, 37 that a landlord has a duty to provide his tenants with a 
minimum level of security from crime, 38 that a psychiatrist or psychiatric 
hospital has a duty to warn potential victims of outpatients, 39 and that 
a parole board has a duty of reasonable care in determining which 
prisoners to release. 40 
In cases involving compulsorily released prisoners, this same type 
of "special relationship" is created between the parole board, the state 
and the victim. Accordingly, courts could rely on these cases to uphold 
a duty of the parole board and state to protect potential victims. 
I. Parole board duty- A growing body of authority has recognized 
the duty of parole boards to restrain or supervise potentially dangerous 
prisoners.' 1 Most courts have held that the parole board's assump-
tion of responsibility for dangerous _prisoners creates the "special 
relationship'' giving rise to this duty. 42 These courts have varied the 
imposed a duty to aid another individual under certain, limited circumstances. The broitde.~t 
of these provisions, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973), imposes a duty upon individuals to 
give such reasonable assistance to another individual in danger of grave physical harm as does 
not place the actor in danger of peril. Some states simply encourage individuals to render aid 
by statutorily granting a limited immunity from civil liability. See, e.g., ALAsICA STAT. § 9.65.090 
(1973) (liability allowed only for gross negligence or intentional miscom\uct). 
36. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 315 (1977), provides that one ordinarily has no duty 
to control the conduct of a third person unless he bears some special relationship to that third 
person or to that third person's potential victim. Under § 319, however, one who takes charge 
of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others 
if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent 
him from doing such harm. Thus, § 319 imposes a duty upon such individuals as parole board 
members and probation officers by virtue of their "assuming parole supervision over, or taking 
charge of, a person having dangerous tendencies." Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 
155 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977) (applying § 319 to the negligent release of a prisoner). 
31. See, e.g., Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 19S9) (holding 
bus driver liable for failure to warn black passengers of white passenger's intent to assault them , 
violently); Terrel v. Key System, 69 Cal. App. 2d 682, 159 P .2d 704 (1945) (holding common 
carrier liable to passenger for failure to provide protection from the violent conduct of others). 
38. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(imposing duty on landlord to take reasonable steps to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal 
· acts committed by third parties); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972) 
(concurring with rule of Kline); cf. Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 
224 N.W.2d 843 (1975) (extending landlord's duty of care to invitees). See also REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND\ OP PROPERTY § 17.3 comment I (1977). 
39. See cases cited supra notes 30-31. 
40. See cases cited supra note 32. 
41. See cases cited supra note 32. For a brief history of this trend, see Payton v. United 
States, 636 F.2d 132, at 147-48 (5th Cir. 1981); see also VIOLENT CRIME REPORT, supra note 4, at 90. 
42. See supra note 36; see also Robilotto v. State, 104 Misc. 2d 713,429 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1980) 
("[Releasing a dangerous individual] provide[s] the legal basis for liability in this case, whether 
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precise scope of this duty in relation to the circumstances of each case, 
and have bound release officials to a duty to restrain the prisoner, 43 
to notify the court, 44 and/ or to warn potential victims. 45 Although 
several factors may influence the nature of the duty imposed, 46 courts 
generally require a duty of care that corresponds to the relative 
foreseeability of the inmate's recidivism. 47 
The special circumstances surrounding compulsory prisoner releases 
would not significantly affect the nature of this parole board duty. 
The mandatory nature of such releases would not affect a parole board's 
ability or duty to notify the court or warn potential victims. At worst, 
the compulsory element in such releases might affect the parole board's 
ability and duty to retain the prisoner in custody. Indeed, it would 
seem inconsistent for a court to order the release of inmates, and then 
hold the parole board to a duty to maintain control over those in-
mates. Yet, as courts generally impose a duty to restrain only those 
prisoners presenting particularly high risks, this incongruity would pro-
bably arise infrequently. 48 
2. State duty- The state, having assumed responsibility for the 
preservation of public safety and the maintenance of a correctional 
system, should rest under a similar duty to prevent negligent and com-
pulsory releases. 49 This duty seems so axiomatic as not to require valida-
deemed grounded on a "special duty" . . . or general tort principles applied to private 
individuals.''). 
43. See, e.g., Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1981); Semler v. Psychiatric 
Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976). 
44. See, e.g., Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976). 
4S. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968); 
Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1964). 
46. For example, in Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 
(1964), the officers had specifically agreed to warn the victim upon the arrestee's release. 
41. See Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1976). 
48. Although violent crime touches six percent of all U.S. households, VIOLENT CRIME 
STAnsncs, supra note 1, at S, only S111/o of prison inmates are violent offenders, id. at 35. 
Thus, nonviolent offenders constitute a large portion of the prison population, and even some 
portion of the violent offenders probably present a low risk of recidivism. Indeed, some prison 
officials claim that between 75-900/o "of the prison population could be freed tomorrow without 
danger to the public or increase in the rate of crime." J. MmoRD, KIND AND UsuAL PUNISH· 
MENT 285 (1973). 
49. Like the parole board, the state has assumed control over persons having dangerous tenden-
cies. Hence, under the RllsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 319 (1977), the state owes a duty of 
protection to its citizens. See supra note 36. 
Analogously, a number of cases establish that the state may be held liable for injuries caused 
by escapees. See, e.g., State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d 591 (1970) (holding governmental 
immunity unavailable to state when escapee from an honor camp forcibly raped plaintifO. The 
escape cases raise a particularly relevant issue. The victim of an escapee might buttress his or 
her tort claim by arguing that the state, by maintaining unconstitutional prison conditions, ac-
tually provoked the prisoner's flight. This argument finds support in a string of recent cases 
in which courts have excused inmates from liability for the crime of escape, if the escape was 
prompted by extraordinarily oppressive and potentially life-threatening prison conditions. See, 
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tion. Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently suggested, "[o]ne of the 
primary functions of government is the preservation of societal order 
through enforcement of the criminal law, and the maintenance of penal 
institutions is an essential part of that task. mo Therefore, when· the 
state fails to maintain adequate prison facilities, and thereby creates 
conditions which precipitate a compulsory release, the state breaches 
a duty to the public. 
Still, the constant flux of economic conditions, sentencing policies, 
and population composition may render it difficult for the state to 
predict the adequacy of its prison facilities. Thus, just as the duty of 
the parole board may vary in relation to the foreseeability of a prisoner's 
additional criminal activity, so the duty of the state may vary in rela-
tion to the foreseeability ·of the inadequacy of its prison facilities. 
Therefore, the nature of the duty imposed upon the state and the parole 
board depends upon the variables affecting the foreseeability of in-
mate recidivism and prison overcrowding. 
B. Foreseeability 
A number of courts have held parole board officials liable for 
damages resulting from the foreseeable acts of negligently released 
inmates. 51 In response to the potential for liability established by these 
cases, and as a general measure to protect the public, parole boards 
rely on a number of indicators to increase the precision of their release 
determinations. Accordingly, parole boards typically consider such 
diverse factors as the applicant's citizenship, education, marital and 
family status, employment record, military service, firearm licenses, 
arrests, convictions, imprisonments, probations, paroles, and finan-
cial assets. 52 Although some statutes direct parole boards to assign 
e.g., ?eople v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974). 
Indeed, some courts and scholars have argued that merely "intolerable" prison conditions 
should excuse an inmate's escape. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 
1978); 13 GA. L. REv. 300, 305 (1978) ("In several recent cases ... courts have admitted evidence 
of prison conditions and have not required a threat of immediate harm as a prerequisite for 
the defense of duress."); see also Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a 
Justification or an Excuse for Escape?, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 135S, 1367 (1979) ("[Assume] 
the defendant escapes from prison to avoid a persistent problem of unsanitary conditions • . • 
the ongoing threat of disease might generate a desparate response in the fonn of an escape, 
and if •.. the defendant's reaction to the danger is sufficiently free from fault, he might well 
be excused."). If the inmate commits additional criminal acts upon escape, the impact of un-
constitutional prison conditions has again extended beyond the prison walls. 
50. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1973). 
51. See supra note 32. 
52. This list of factors appears in the RULES OP THE UNITED STATES BOARD OF PAROLB § 
4.4 (1961). Though the U.S. Parole Board currently employs a more complex, more objective 
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various levels of significance to different factors, most parole deci-
sions result from broad exercises of discretion and intuition. 53 
Predictions based on these factors, however, have not proven very 
accurate, 54 and parole boards can only rarely foresee the exact conse-
quences of a given inmate's release. To compensate for this inaccuracy, 
courts have adopted a flexible foreseeability test that does not demand 
predictability of "the precise events which occurred," but that requires 
"only that the events were within the scope of the foreseeable risk." 55 
This test prevents the parole board from avoiding liability by asserting 
that the exact actions of an inmate were unforeseeable. Consequently, 
victims can.recover without facing insurmountable problems of proof, 
and the courts hold the parole board to a standard rigorous enough 
to guarantee reasonably accurate release determinations. Because of 
its flexibility and effective balancing of the interests of the victim and 
the parole board, courts could appropriately apply this foreseeability 
test to compulsory release suits. 
Even this more flexible foreseeability test, however, might not seem 
to allow for all of the complexities of the compulsory release context. 
For example, the state's maintenance of overcrowded prison facilities 
may adversely affect the parole board's ability to determine the scope 
of foreseeable risk. Prison overcrowding may limit the opportunity of 
officials to observe closely individual inmates. 56 In addition, the com-
pulsory release context increases this danger by limiting the period of 
time during which the officials could monitor an inmate's behavior. 57 
set of factors, most parole boards continue to apply discretionary factors similar to those 
enumerated in the 1961 Rules. 
53. See R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, supra note 6, at 287 (criticizing this broad discretion, 
and labeling even the more specific federal criteria as "too cryptic"). See generally A. SMITH 
& L. BawN, INTRODUCTION ro PROBATION AND PAROLE 32-71 (1976); Kastenmeier & Eglit, Parole 
Release Decision-Making, in PAROLE: LEGAL ISSUESIDECISION-MAKING/REsEARcH 89-93 (W. Amos 
& C. Newman eds. 1975). 
54. Indeed, one study "found that experts were no better than students at predicting parole 
violations and both groups were worse than chance." J. Carroll, Judgment of Recidivism Risk: 
The Use of Base-Rate Information in Parole Decisions, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOOICAL 
RllsEARCH 69 (P. Lipsitt & B. Sales eds. 1980). 
55. Williams v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1040, 1046 (D.S.D. 1978). 
56. See, e.g., St. George v. State, 203 Misc. 340, 118 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1953) (suggesting that 
overcrowding in an institution may prevent administrators from reaching an informed decision), 
rev'd, 283 A.O. 245, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147, qffd, 308 N.Y. 681, 124 N.E.2d 320 {1954). Similarly, 
Richard Dunn, chief judge of the Wayne County Circuit Court in Detroit, has suggested that 
release under the Michigan Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, supra note 6, adversely af-
fects the parole board's objective assessment of cases. See Silas, supra note 5, at 1352 (["The 
parole boards] know they have to meet a quota, and they don't screen in a normal way."). 
57. An inmate's behavior in prison may serve as. a valuable indicator of the likelihood of 
his recidivism, and parole boards typically consider this factor carefully. See generally A. SMITH 
& L. BERLIN, supra note 53, at 63-64. Prison overcrowding, by increasing the difficulty of trac-
ing violent acts to individual inmates, may render this valuable information unavailable. But 
see N. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 16 ("Prison behavior is not a predictor of community behavior . 
• . . [O]bservation of the behavior of prisoners while in prison is of little assistance .... "). 
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Thus, the state's economic misallocations and negligent correctional 
policies could significantly aggravate the difficulty of the parole board's 
already difficult task. As a result, a court might hold parole board 
officials liable for erroneous determinations arising from state policies 
beyond their control. 
Nevertheless, the flexible foreseeability test accommodates the ex-
igencies of the compulsory release context. Courts will only hold the 
parole board liable for events within "the scope of foreseeable risk." 
If parole board officials can demonstrate that state prison administra-
tion rendered it impossible to determine that an inmate's postrelease 
actions fell within the scope of foreseeable risk, they will escape liability. 
Therefore, in all probability, the parole board will not suffer any un-
just liability. 
Although demonstrating the foreseeability of inadequate prison 
facilities presents complex factual issues, two observations illustrate 
that such a demonstration does not demand any unduly intricate form 
of analysis. First, although numerous factors may affect the adequacy 
of prison facilities, the probable impact of those factors may be relatively 
easy to gauge. Economic conditions, the rate of crime, and the com-
position of the population all affect prison overcrowding, and all follow 
relatively consistent and predictable developmental patterns. Second, 
the state need not be able to foresee the precise consequences of main-
taining inadequate prison facilities in order to be held liable for those 
consequences. Rather, a finding of state liability only requires that those 
consequences fall within the scope of foreseeable risk. 58 
Although foreseeability affects the level of duty imposed upon the 
state and its agents, it does not determine the level of liability imposed 
for the breach of that duty. For plaintiffs to establish the defendant's 
appropriate level of liability, it is necessary that they establish, first, 
that the breach of duty caused the victim's injuries and, second, that 
policy considerations do not confer immunity from liability upon the 
state and its agents. 
C. Proximate Causation 
A widely accepted definition of proximate causation states that "con-
·duct is a cause of the event if it was a material element and a ~ubstan-
58. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Consideratons affecting the scope of foreseeable 
risk would include the number of inmates to be released, the security classification of the facil-
ity, the capacity of the employment market for an influx of applicants with criminal records, 
reductions in the community police force, and the records of individual prisoners. With only 
a few exceptions, and with some allowance for scale, these considerations duplicate typical in-
dividual parole considerations. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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tial factor in bringing it about. us9 Because the negligent decisions of 
release officials play a key role in enabling prisoners to commit crimes, 
a number of courts have identified negligent releases as the proximate 
cause of victims' injuries. 60 Thus, if a parolee's criminal actions fall 
within the scope of foreseeable risk, the negligent release constitutes 
the proximate cause of the victim's damages. 
The state's maintenance of overcrowded prison facilities may directly 
affect the causal relationship between the parole board's erroneous deci-
sions and the victim's damages, rendering it difficult for the victim 
to establish parole board liability. Ordinarily, a parole board may elect 
to release as few or as many eligible prisoners as it ~elieves present 
a low threat of recidivism. Where overcrowding results in compulsory 
releases, however, the board must grant parole to a specified number 
of prisoners within a specified period of time. Because this denial of 
discretion, coupled with the adverse effects of overcrowding on the 
accuracy of recidivism predictions, renders it difficult to establish parole 
board liability, the victim may be forced to sue the state. 
Nonetheless, two principal arguments might obstruct a victim's suit 
against the state. First, the compulsory nature of the release might not 
significantly accelerate the date of the inmate's parole61 and might not 
prevent the parole board from making an informed decision. In such 
a case, the state's maintenance of inadequate prison facilities would 
probably bear no causal relationship to the victim's injuries. Yet, the 
magnitude and urgency of most compulsory releases suggest that very 
few decisions are made in such a vacuum. 62 Second, if citizens refuse 
to provide a tax base sufficient to support state prison-building 
59. w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 240 (4th ed. 1971) (hereinafter cited as 
PROSSER]; see also Williams v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1040, 1046 (D.S.D. 1978) (holding 
that "the negligent act must be a substantial factor in bringing about the hann"); R.Esl'ATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 433 (1965) (concurring with Prosser definition). 
60. Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121, 126 (4th Cir. 1976) ("The breach of .•. duty, 
followed by the foreseeable harm on which it was predicated, in itself demonstrates proximate 
cause."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); see, e.g., Williams v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 
1040 (D.S.D. 1978) (hosptial's failure to notify authorities of release of mental patient constituted 
negligence that proximately caused the patient's murder of the plaintiff's decedent); cf. Com-
iskey v. State, 71 A.D.2d 699, 418 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1979) (holding that state's negligence in inade-
quately supervising a mental patient proximately caused his suicide). But see Rivers v. State, 
133 Vt. 11, 328 A.2d 398 (1974) (holding that inmate's criminal acts and reckless driving broke 
the causal chain between his release and his collision with the plaintiff's decedent). The court 
in Rivers, however, failed to recognize that, even if the intervening acts break the chain of prox-
imate cause, a finding of the foreseeability of such acts still establishes negligence. See PROSSER, 
supra note 59, at 272. 
61. See supra note 6. 
62. Indeed, it strains credulity to suggest that the court-ordered release of hundreds of inmates 
within several months proves conducive to cautious, detached reflection. See supra note 56 and 
accompanying texf. Nonetheless, states with statutorily prescribed, objective parole standards 
might preserve such caution. See infra note 93. 
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projects, 63 then it seems inaccurate to assert that the state caused the 
compulsory prisoner releases. This argument, however, erroneously 
assumes that the only alternative to compulsory releases is prison con-
struction. Instead, states may develop sentencing policies and establish 
systems of community corrections in order to insure prison capacity 
for high-risk and repeat offenders.64 Moreover, in most instances the 
state maintains control over the allocation of funds to the correctional 
system, and remains capable of improving prison conditions. 65 Thus, 
the state cannot claim that it is not responsible for current prison policy 
and its consequences. 
IV. IMMUNITY 
To establish tort liability, a compulsory release victim suing either 
the parole board or state must overcome the def ens es of official and 
sovereign immunity. These immunity principles derive from a variety 
of authorities. Courts have based parole board immunity upon the 
eleventh amendment, 66 state constitutional provisions, 67 state statutes, 68 
and the common law maxim that "the King can do no wrong. " 69 
Nonetheless, courts and legislatures have subjected the doctrine of im-
63. See supra note 4. 
64. High-risk offenders probably constitute a relatively small portion of the inmate popula-
tion. See supra note 48. Moreover, "[s}ome [criminals} account for a disproportionately large . 
number of violent offenses." N. MoRIUs, supra note 4, at 86. Thus, a number of criminologists 
have advocated the exclusive use of prisons for violent, high-risk offenders. See generally N. 
MoRIUS, supra note 4, at 8S-121. Such approaches preserve public safety and comply with the 
demands of budgetary restrictions. Indeed, states may change sentencing policies at no signifi-
cant expense, may use existing facilities to house the limited number of high-risk offenders, and 
may develop community corrections programs for low-risk offenders at considerably less cost 
than that entailed in the construction of a prison. R. GoLDFARB & L. SINGER, supra note 6, at 558. 
6S. See Smith, Prison Reform Through the Legislature, in THE Pouncs OF PUNISHMENT (1973) 
(citing the low political influence of prisoners as a cause of the neglect of correctional facilities); 
N. MoRIUS, supra note 4, at 37 ("By and large, the public is uninterested in prison matters, 
except morbidly at times of riots ... [and most politicians} are well aware that there are no 
votes to be gained in penal reform."). 
66. See, e.g., Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478 (M.D. Ala. 
1976), afj'd, S48 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1977); Reiff v. Pennsylvania, 397 F. Supp. 34S (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
67. See, e.g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa. 558,370 A.2d 1163 (1977) (holding that state 
constitution precluded wrongful death action against the state). As noted in Heifetz v. Philadelphia 
State Hosp., 482 Pa. 386, 393 A.2d 1160 (1978), however, the state supreme court later abolished 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania. 
68. For three cases precluding the liability of release officials, decided under a California 
immunity statute, see Buford v. State, 104 Cal. App. 3d 811, 164 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1980); Thompson 
v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 2d 741,614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rpir. 70 (1980); State v. Superior 
Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 1023, 112 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1974). 
69. Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd, 
S48 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1977), predicated immunity upon the eleventh amendment and upon the 
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. For a general history of the common law doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, see PROSSER, supra note S9, at 971. 
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munity to numerous exceptions and interpretations, and the immunity 
of the state has been caught in a tide of abolition. 7° Consequently, 
applying the doctrine of immunity requires the manipulation of com-
plex, often inconsistent standards, several of which apply to a victim's 
suit for injuries caused by a compulsorily released prisoner. 71 This com-
plexity and inconsistency may work capriciously in denying victims relief. 
In such instances, existing immunity law should be modified to grant 
victims a more effective remedy. 
A. Official Immunity 
In order to obtain a personal judgment against a public official, the 
victim must overcome the defense of official immunity. Courts and 
legislatures have generally conferred a broad immunity from personal 
liability upon individual members of a parole board. 12 Such immunity 
protects the ability of parole board members "to exercise independent 
judgment without pressure of personal liability for acts of the subject 
of their deliberations. " 73 Indeed, some courts have reasoned that parole 
board members require the same absolute immunity from tort liability 
afforded to high public officials. 74 Jurisdictions that provide such com-
prehensive immunity ostensibly eliminate any victim suits against parole 
board members. 
Some courts, however, have granted parole board members only the 
qualified immunity from tort liability afforded to low public officials, 
thus immunizing their "discretionary" - though not their "ministerial" 
70. PROSSER, supra note 59, at 977. 
71. Many victims' suits against third parties for manifestly negligent releases fail because 
of immunity. See, e.g., Lloyd v. State, 251 N.W.2d 551 .(Iowa 1971) (holding that director of 
bureau of adult corrections was immune from suit for negligently releasing dangerous inmate 
who attacked a man and sexually assaulted a woman upon release); Burg v. State, 147 N.J. 
Super. 316, 371 A.2d 308 (1977) (holding state immune from suit for releasing dangerous felon 
who assaulted plaintiff while on release); Taylor v. State, 36 A.D.2d 878, 320 N.Y.S.2d 343 
(1971) (immunity held applicable to parole board for releasing prisoner - a prior sexual of-
fender - who, upon release, killed the plaintiff's daughter), motion to dismiss appeal denied, 
33 N.Y.2d 937, 309 N.E.2d 128 (1971). 
72. See, e.g., Siess v. McConnell, 74 Mich. App. 613,255 N.W.2d 2 (1977) (holding release 
and corrections officia!s immune from suit for the consequences of their discretionary acts); 
Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (holding parole 
officials protected by the same absolute immunity afforded judges for acts resulting from the 
p~rformance of their official duties), aff'd, 548 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1977); Reiff v. Pennsylvania, 
397 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding officials immune from suit for damages resulting 
from the performance of discretionary, quasi-judicial duties). 
73. Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, ~09 F. Supp. 478, 479 (M.D. Ala. 1976), 
aff'd, 548 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1977). 
74. See, e.g., Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478 (M.D. Ala. 
1976), qff'd, 548 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1977); Reiff v. Commonwealth, 23 Pa. Comrnw. 537, 354 
A.2d 918 (1976). 
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- acts. 7s Discretionary acts include those requiring "personal delibera-
tion, decision and judgment,'' while ministerial acts include those re-
quiring only "an obedience to orders, or the performance of a duty 
in which the officer is left no choice of his own. " 76 Unfortunately, 
the dichotomy between discretionary and ministerial acts has proven 
particularly difficult to apply to parole board actions. For example, 
a split in authority renders it unclear whether a parole officer's super-
vision of a parolee constitutes a discretionary or a ministerial act. 77 
Many courts, however, concur in labeling the actual release decision 
as discretionary,78 and the parole officer's notification of release to 
the court or to potential victims as ministerial. 79 Thus, in a number 
of states, unless the parole officer erred in neglecting to notify the 
court or to warn a potential victim, immunity will shield his acts from 
personal liability. 80 
The artificiality of the distinctions between high and low govern-
ment officials, and between discretionary and ministerial acts, has led 
some courts to create standards for personal immunity predicated upon 
more straightforward, more equitable considerations. For example, in 
Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Paroles, 81 the Arizona Supreme 
Court concluded that ''immunity deprives individuals of a remedy for 
wrongdoing and should be bestowed only when and at the • level 
necessary." 82 Therefore, the court abolished unqualified immunity, and 
instituted a standard allowing ''liability only for the grossly negligent 
or reckless release of a highly dangerous prisoner. " 83 Similarly, in Estate 
of Armstrong v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & P.arole, 84 the Com-
monwealth Court of Pennsylvania eschewed the common law distinc-
tions, and held that the immunity of public officials should rest upon 
15. See, e.g., Siess v. McConnell, 74 Mich. App. 613, 255 N.W.2d 2 (1977); Reiff v. Com-
monwealth, 23 Pa. Commw. 537, 354 A.2d 918 (1976). 
76. PROSSER, supra note 59, at 988-89. 
11. See, e.g., Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding parole 
officer liable for injuries caused by inadequately supervised parolee), modified, 580 F.2d 647 
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 409 F. Supp .. 478 (M.D. Ala. 
1976), aff'd, 548 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding parole board members immune from suit 
for negligent supervision of parolee). 
18. See, e.g., Smart v. United States, '21J7 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1953); Thompson v. County 
of Alameda, 27 Cal. 2d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980); Lloyd v. State, 251 N.W.2d 
551 (Iowa 1977). 
19. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
80. Courts have recognized some other exceptions to this broad grant of immunity. First, 
immunity does not embrace the malicious acts of parole board members. Second, immunity does 
not apply to officials acting outside of their authority (though it does apply to officials merely 
acting in excess of their authority). See generally PROSSER, supra note 59, at 989, 991. Still, these 
exceptions apply only rarely, and do not significantly affect the general scope of official immunity. 
81. 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977). 
82. Id. at 265, 564 P .2d at 1232. 
83. Id. at 268, 564 P .2d at 1235. 
84. 46 Pa. Commw. 33, 405 A.2d 1099 (1979). 
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the case-by-case consideration of four factors: (1) "whether public policy 
would be promoted in shielding the defendant from liability"; (2) 
whether the "actions complained of could be measured against a predic-
table standard of care"; (3) "whether, but for the defendant's status, 
a right of action would lie under analogous rules of law," and (4) 
''whether the plaintiff [had] improperly failed to avail himself of other 
available remedies. " 85 Such clear and cogent standards evince the un-
necessary complexity of the common law rules, 86 and hopefully signal 
the direction of the future in the law of official immunity. 
Without such stabilizing reform, however, the success of a victim's 
attempt to impose personal liability upon negligent members of parole 
boards would remain uncertain. In jurisdictions applying the common 
law, victims must both persuade the court to classify parole board 
members as low government officials, and prove that their injuries 
resulted from the negligent performance of a board member's ministerial 
act. As these preliminary elements may be difficult or impossible to 
prove under the law of some states, the victim's suit could be defeated 
even before evidence was introduced on the substantive tort issues. Con-
versely, in those jurisdictions that apply standards similar to those of 
Grimm81 or Armstrong, 88 the victim's primary obstacle would be satis-
fying the elements of tort. These standards would permit more consis-
tent and equitable relief and off er models of the type of reform necessary 
iri this area. 
B. Sovereign Immunity 
1. Sovereign immunity in actions against the parole board- In 
order to obtain a judgment against the parole board as a governmen-
tal agency, the victim must overcome the defense of sovereign immunity. 
Although the eleventh amendment confers absolute immunity on the 
state and its agencies, 89 most jurisdictions have either limited or 
abrogated that immunity. 9° Consequently, a number of courts have 
85. Id. at 36, 405 A.2d at 1101. Actually, Armstrong merely implemented the standards 
established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 
A.2d 293 (1978). 
86. Numerous legal scholars have criticized the complexity and ambiguity of the common 
law rules. See generally PROSSER, supra note 59, at 991. 
87. 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977). 
88. 46 Pa. Commw. 33, 405 A.2d 1099 (1979). 
89. · See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
90. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 569 (1976) ("Not too long ago a survey of the 
[judicial attack on sovereign immunity] ... could assert that 'the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity has never been expressly repudiated by an American court.' Such a statement would now 
be very far from accurate.''); Littlejohn & Kotch, Torts, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 655, 658-59 (1978) 
(observing that, as of 1977, 9 states had retained immunity, 5 states waived immunity in cases 
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held states liable for the negligent release decisions of their parole 
boards.91 • 
Unfortunately, the scope of sovereign immunity, like the scope of 
official immunity, varies significantly from state to state. Some states, 
such as California, have implemented immunity standards similar to 
those of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 92 Those states provide a general 
waiver of immunity, while preserving an exception for the discretionary 
acts or functions of governmental officials. Thus, in some jurisdic-
tions, the victim would encounter the same difficult distinction between 
ministerial and discretionary acts encountered in attempting to impose 
personal liability upon the individual members of the parole board. 93 
Some states, however, such as New York, have completely abolished 
sovereign immunity,94 consenting to have liability "determined in ac-
cordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions ... against 
individuals or corporations. " 95 In those states, if the victim establishes 
the elements of tort, sovereign immunity will not obstruct the action. 
Thus, the survival of the victim's action may be predicated upon the 
nature and extent of the state's waiver of immunity. 
2. Sovereign immunity in actions against the state- Sovereign 
immunity would also apply to the victim's action against the state for 
of insurance, 8 states retained only partial immunity, and 19 states had either judicially or statutorily 
abolished immunity); see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8958 (1977) ("[t]he modern 
rule is that the state and its agencies are subject to liability in tort"). 
91. See supra note 32. 
92. See CAL. Gov'T. CODE§§ 810-996.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983). The Federal Tort Claims 
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), 
originally enacted in 1946, provided the model for a number of state statutes. 
93. A victim's action against the United States Parole Board, however, might not encounter 
this obstacle. In 1979, the United States Parole Board established a system of guidelines to aid 
in the decision-making process. The board contrived a matrix system with two axes: one rating 
different offenses O!,l a scale of one through six (as determined by the Parole Board according 
to the facts of each case), and one rating the inmate's prognosis on parole. The two indicators 
interact to form a table, which the Parole Board employs to set a release date. 28 C.F.R. § 
2.20 (1982). 
In Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that release decisions made under these guidelines were sufficiently "mechanical" to render 
them "ministerial." Therefore, the court held that the Federal Tort Cairns Act immunity for 
discretionary functions did not protect the Parole Board's negligent release determination. In 
response to Payton, the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime suggested the implemen-
·tation of a specific statutory exception to the Tort Cairns Act that would allow for Parole Board 
liability for the results of grossly negligent release decisions. See VIOLENT CRIME REPORT, supra 
note 4, at 90. Such an amendment was included in S. 2420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 CoNO. 
REc. S3853-63 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1982) (statement of Sen. Heinz), but did not survive into the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNo. & 
AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 1248. The actual impact of federal statutes governing parole liability might be 
fairly negligible, in any event, as only seven percent of all adult inmates are located in federal 
prisons. VIOLENT CRIME STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 45. 
94. See N.Y. JUD.-CT. CL. ACT LAW § 8 (McKinney 1963). 
95. Id. 
118 Journal of Law Reform (VOL. 17:1 
failure to maintain adequate prison facilities and to prevent the com-
pulsory release of dangerous inmates. Yet, the application of sovereign 
immunity to such an action entails additional, more complex considera-
tions. Moreover, these difficulties become apparent regardless of how 
the victim structures the suit. 96 For example, if suit is brought against 
a governmental agency such as the board of corrections, a court would 
probably apply standards of sovereign immunity identical to those they 
would apply in suits against the parole board. Consequently, the jurisdic-
tion's immunity standards might again block the victim's action by 
requiring him to address the difficult distinction between discretionary 
and ministerial acts. 
Still, decisions concerning the operation of a state's prison system 
seem to reflect broader policy and administrative considerations than 
are entailed in decisions concerning the release of individual inmates. 
Thus, the victim may not be able to attribute the maintenance of un-
constitutional prison facilities to a particular governmental agency, but 
may only be able to attribute such conditions to the state's long-standing, 
broadly based neglect of its correctional institutions. Unfortunately, 
courts may prove reluctant to interfere with such fundamental policy 
and administrative determinations. 97 Consequently, even in states that 
have wholly abrogated immunity, the court's refusal to intervene in 
certain state functions might preclude the victim's recovery. 
Nonetheless, judicial respect for state administrative autonomy has 
not led courts to def er to every state policy decision. 98 Indeed, courts 
have frequently nullified unconscionable state policies - particularly 
those that impose upon individual constitutional rights. For example, 
in a number of prisoners' rights cases, courts have insisted that insuf-
ficient funding does not excuse unconstitutional prison conditions. 99 
96. The variety of officials and entities named as defendants in prisoners' rights cases reveals 
the difficulty of determining the parties responsible for the maintenance of inadequate facilities. 
Named defendants have included commissioners of corrections, captains of police departments, 
members of boards of corrections, governors, state treasurers, states, counties, penitentiary 
superintendents, prison wardens, and directors of divisions of corrections. 
97. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B comment d (1977): 
Determinations of priorities in the allocation of available funds or facilities or man-
power, with the result that certain purely governmental services may not always be 
available to everyone, are often treated as types of fundamental administrative deci-
sions that the court should not attempt to second-guess. 
98. Note the abrogation of the "hands off'' doctrine, as manifested in the cases cited supra 
note 2. 
99. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 1972) ("the court [below] did not abuse 
its discretion in requiring defendant sheriff to make certain specified changes in his budget and 
in his deployment of manpower"); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194, 201 
" (8th Cir. 1974) ("lack of funds is not an acceptable excuse for unconstitutional conditions of 
incarceration"); see, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976) ("a state 
is not at liberty to afford its citizens only those constitutional rights which fit comfortably within 
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Although victims' rights probably do not rise to the constitutional 
level, 100 courts should not def~r to the autonomy of a state that has 
exhibited such manifest disregard for the rights of prisoners and the 
safety of the public. As the Supreme Court recently asserted in Rhodes 
v. Chapman, 101 prison overcrowding arises "from neglect rather than 
policy. There is no reason of comity, judicial· restraint, or recognition 
of expertise for courts to defer to negligent omissions of officials who 
lack the resources or motivation to operate prisons within limits of 
decency. '' 102 
The success of a victim's suit for injuries caused by a compulsorily 
released prisoner may largely depend upon such formalities as naming 
the correct governmental and individual defendants, and upon the for-
tuity of the jurisdiction in which the injuries occurred. Although the 
abolition of immunity represents the current trend, the remnants of 
that doctrine cause an unsettling element of unpredictability. In order 
to insure that victims may recover for their injuries, states should limit 
or abrogate immunity, and should implement clear and equitable stan-
dards by which to determine the scope of liability. At present, however, 
the doctrine of immunity produces inconsistent, often capricious results. 
its budget"), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, S59 ·F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part 
sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, cert. denied in part, 438 U.S. 91S (1978). 
100. The issue of whether victims' rights rise to the constitutional level evokes questions of 
great complexity and controversy. Some advocates of civil liberties have observed that the Con-
stitution contains no explicit guarantees of victims' rights, as contrasted with its explicit guarantees 
of arrestees' rights, defendants' rights, and prisoners' rights. Therefore, these individuals con-
clude that the victim's primary role in the justice system is to act as a witness for the prosecu-
tion. See, e.g., F. CARRINGTON, supra note 17, at 77 (citing Washington Star-News, July 8, 197S, 
at I, col. 1 (interview with Alan Goldstein, legal staffer of the Maryland affiliate of the A.C.L.U.; 
Goldstein arguing that victims are principally witnesses for the prosecution)). But see id. at 80-81 
(discussing civil libertarian Sidney Hook's advocacy of victims' rights). 
Advocates of victim's rights have responded by arguing that this omission merely reflects an 
assumption by the framers of the Constitution that the rights of victims so obviously inhere 
within the general language and spirit of the Constitution as not to require a specific guarantee. 
See Carrington, supra note 26, at 4S0. As Carrington has observed, "it might be difficult to 
get across to a young woman who has just been gang-raped that the document upon which our 
government is premised relegates her to the status of a mere 'witness for the prosecution.• " Id. 
The resolution of this controversy lies beyond the scope of this Note and, in any event, the 
controversy presents questions primarily of academic interest. The essential point is that victims' 
rights - whether or not they rise to the constitutional level - merit protection. As Justice Goldberg 
has commented: 
Even though I cannot with propriety postulate that the Constitution requires compensa-
tion for victims of violence, I can state my opinion that the victim of crime has, in 
a fundamental sense, been denied the 'protection' of the laws, and that society should 
assume some responsibility for making him whole. What the equal protection clause 
of the Constitution does not command, it may still inspire. 
Goldberg, Governmental Compensation for Victims of Violence-Preface, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 
1, 2-3 (1970). 
101. 4S2 U.S. 337 (1981). 
102. Id. at 362. 
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Although compulsory prisoner releases provide the most immediate, 
most economically feasible solution to prison overcrowding, states 
should avoid such releases whenever possible.· If, however, a state mus.t 
grant early release to a portion of the inmate population, such releases 
should result from the thoughtful review of each eligible inmate. To 
ensure cautious state action, and to prevent state agents from acting 
recklessly, state laws should permit victims to pursue actions for in-
juries caused by compulsorily released prisoners. Courts could base 
such a remedy on existing tort theory permitting suits against third 
parties whose gross negligence or recklessness causes or facilitates a 
criminal act. 
The law of immunity presents the single major obstacle in creating 
such a cause of action. The limitation of governmental officers' per-
sonal liabi}tty may enhance the accuracy and objectivity of release deci-
sions, but official immunity is tolerable only if governmental tort liability 
provides a substitute source of reparation.103 Nonetheless, although most 
states have limited or abrogated sovereign immunity, the remnants of 
that immunity prevent the effectuation of a nationally consistent policy 
of victim reparation. Victim compensation statutes currently off er some 
alternative relief. Still, until those statutes provide a greater level of 
compensation for a greater number of victims, courts and legislatures 
should continue to limit the doctrine of immunity and encourage the 
development of suits for injured victims. The state should not impose 
the costs of its own negligence upon the victims of violent crime. 
-Leonard M Niehoff 
103. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 90, at 563. 
